The Russian breakthrough near Otscheretyne in Donetsk has the potential to “grow into a major breakthrough,” says Markus Reisner in his look at the front. In the worst case, Ukraine is threatened with a local collapse of the front. Reisner sees Ukraine currently facing five problems. “At the moment everyone is actually waiting for the ATACMS effect,” says the Austrian Army’s Ukraine expert. “Until now it didn't exist.”
Markus Reisner is a colonel in the Austrian armed forces and analyzes the war situation in Ukraine every Monday at ntv.de.
(Photo: ntv.de)
ntv.de: Is the situation at the front really as dynamic as Ukrainian army chief Olexander Syrskyj said on Sunday? “The situation is changing dynamically – in some areas the enemy has achieved tactical successes, in other areas we have been able to improve the tactical position of our troops,” he said. It sounds as if there is sometimes success for one side, sometimes for the other.
Markus Reisner: In military parlance, “dynamics” is a synonym for the fact that the situation is serious and can quickly develop in an undesirable direction. The situation on the front in Ukraine is actually developing very dynamically. Last week there was a potentially major breach by the Russians into the Ukrainian delaying or defensive positions near the town of Ocheretyne. The situation there has the potential to become a major breakthrough. In the worst case, there is a risk of a local collapse of the Ukrainian front. A comparison to Popasna in May 2022 comes to mind here.
Popasna was then conquered by the Russians.
The capture of Popasna and the resulting breakthrough through the Ukrainian first line of defense led to the encirclement battle of Lysychansk and Sievierodonetsk, which the Russians won. A year later, also in May, the breakthrough occurred at Soledar and Bakhmut. I find it remarkable that these escalations always occur in May. Apparently the political leadership in Moscow is putting enormous pressure on the military leadership: On May 9th, Russia celebrates Victory Day, i.e. the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany.
What is the reason for the break-in at Otscheretyne? The lack of ammunition?
Not only. In my opinion there are several reasons. First, it is obvious that Ukraine has a shortage of combat operational reserves. We saw that the 47th Mechanized Brigade was quickly brought up to the front at Otscheretyne. This brigade is a type of front-line fire brigade that has been in operation since it was set up two years ago. It was used at the beginning of the later failed Ukrainian offensive in the south, near Tokmak. From there it was moved to Avdiivka and is now in use northwest of it. But this brigade is already very worn out – this is one of the brigades that was equipped with Leopard main battle tanks. After some losses, at least one company in this brigade received Abrams tanks instead. This tank company has now also been badly hit – it has suffered over 50 percent failures. And there have just been reports that these Abrams have now been completely withdrawn. In any case, the brigade was not strong enough to repel the Russian attack. This shows that Ukraine is having problems putting together combat reserves.
The availability of artillery ammunition is the second dilemma. At Avdiivka and Bakhmut the Russians have a ten to one artillery superiority over the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians can slow down the Russian attacks with their first-person view drones. But these drones do not have the range needed to impact Russian artillery. This leads to the third dilemma.
The Ukrainian army's lack of anti-aircraft defense?
With their artillery and the use of glide bombs with weights of up to 1,500 kilograms, the Russians are actually bombing their way out. In order to be able to counter the glide bombs, Ukraine would need more medium and high-range anti-aircraft systems. The Russian Air Force currently has local air superiority and can support the attacking ground troops in such a way that the Ukrainian positions are effectively bombed ready for attack.
Something for which the Ukrainian troops lack the material.
This is dilemma number four: the inability of the Ukrainian armed forces to attack and disrupt Russian supply lines, logistics hubs and command posts at the operational level. Ukraine lacks the necessary ground-to-ground systems or medium-range air-to-ground systems to work behind the front lines – ground-to-ground, that would be the ATACMS, which we have been talking about for weeks and which Ukraine has not yet had in significant quantities had available. And air-to-ground would be weapon systems that could be delivered with the F-16 fighter jets.
The US announced last Wednesday that it had already delivered long-range ATACMS.
At the moment everyone is actually waiting for the ATACMS effect, which we talked about a week ago. Until now it didn't exist.
Ukraine's fifth dilemma is that the quality of their second and third lines of defense does not match that of their first line. The first line fortresses were built between 2014 and 2022, but they have now all been more or less breached. To the west of it, the Ukrainians have often set up additional delay positions in the last two years in order to gain time for expansion. But expanding such positions or even fortress-like bases during war is much more difficult. These deficits are now becoming very noticeable, especially northwest of Avdiivka. With regard to Otscheretyne, the Russians are already talking about the flower that has begun to bloom.
A flower?
This is how Russian military bloggers and army personnel describe a successful breakthrough. The opening petals represent the advances of the Russian units.
How can Ukraine respond?
General Syrskyj must now act quickly and decisively. He must bring further reserves at least to the region behind the break-in point. These forces must be deployed along existing defensive positions or at least along a favorable section of terrain, i.e. along rivers, canals or railway embankments. And the incoming material must be used as quickly as possible. This may mean foregoing ATACMS attacks on Crimea for now and instead focusing on Russian logistics and leadership behind the front at Avdiivka and Bakhmut. It can be assumed that the Russians will increase the aggressiveness of their attacks until May 9th.
A Ukrainian military spokeswoman yesterday denied that the Abrams tanks had been withdrawn. Can you say whether there was a relocation of the tanks?
With both the Russians and Ukrainians consistently releasing countless drone videos, we have a pretty good overview of what's happening on the front lines. And for ten days there has been no video showing Abrams being deployed by the 47th Brigade. This suggests they were withdrawn from the front to avoid being destroyed or captured by Russian first-person view drones. In fact, there were two or three Russian videos showing Russian recovery vehicles towing an Abrams. He is probably already on his way to Moscow, where a propaganda exhibition is being prepared in preparation for May 9th, at which Western military equipment will be on display – including a Leopard 2 A6.
The exhibition is entitled “History repeats itself. Our victory is inevitable”.
Behind the tanks you can see the flags saying “Pobeda!” means “Victory!”. This is the typical connection for Russia to the narrative of the Great Patriotic War. There is also a German Marder II in the exhibition. This was a light tank destroyer that the German Wehrmacht used in the Second World War. This is compared to a modern-day Marder armored personnel carrier that was captured in Ukraine. I wouldn't be surprised if pictures soon appeared of an old German Tiger tank that was taken from Moscow's Kubinka Tank Museum and placed next to the Leopard.
Does this type of propaganda, the equation of the German attack on the Soviet Union with the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, work?
The Russians are told that tens of thousands of Western mercenaries are deployed in Ukraine – mercenaries from countries that from Russia's perspective are hereditary enemies, such as Poland and Germany. We can see how well this propaganda is catching on by the fact that there is no uprising among the population. There is no Lenin to be seen calling for a ceasefire and inciting the people. There is also no visible opposition within the political leadership. A large part of the Russian population does not live in Moscow or Saint Petersburg, but in villages and cities whose names are hardly known in the West. The propaganda works particularly well there. And then Ukraine also provides templates for this propaganda: on Ukrainian tanks you can often see so-called bar crosses, which were used to mark German vehicles in the Second World War.
Why do Ukrainian tanks wear such crosses?
There are nationalist elements in the Ukrainian army. You can always see the black and red of the Bandera movement, in which the Azov Regiment has its roots, which played an important role in the defense of Mariupol in 2022. When Ukrainian soldiers with Nazi tattoos were taken out of the cellars there, it was perfect propaganda material for the Russians – even if the same tattoos can be seen in the Russian army.
A few days ago, military economist Marcus Keupp told the “Kölnische Rundschau” that Russia had strategically lost the war. By autumn 2023 at the latest, it was clear that the Russian production rate could not keep up with the rate of wear and tear. How do you see that?
It is not my place to make comments about others. However, I would like to warn against hoping for a turn in the war that we have not yet seen. You have to take the situation seriously and prepare for extreme cases. German Defense Minister Pistorius recently pointed out that Russia appears to be producing more material than it immediately needs for the war. What is the point of this overproduction? Are the next war already being prepared here? If you don't consider such possibilities, the surprise can be nasty. We can't say we didn't know.
Hubertus Volmer spoke to Markus Reisner
