Even in the election campaign, it is not always easy to recognize differences between the parties. But they exist. Polarization is increasing, especially with topics such as migration and climate, says political scientist Anna-Sophie Kurella in an interview with ntv.de. The new “pole parties” are no longer left and economic liberal, but right -wing populist and green parties – AfD and Greens in Germany.
For government formation, this means that it becomes more difficult, according to the political scientist. Not only because more parties are in parliament. “It will also be more difficult to say what 'the will of the voters' is.” In the past, it was relatively easy to recognize after elections. That has changed.
Anna-Sophie Kurella heads a project for the “development of political space in multi-party systems” at the Mannheim Center for European Social Research.
(Photo: private)
ntv.de: A common prejudice against the parties is that they are becoming increasingly similar. Is that correct?
Anna-Sophie Kurella: You have to differentiate whether the voters' view is meant or the assessment of experts, for example from political scientists. And then of course it depends on the topics.
Let's take the voters first.
In economic policy, the established parties of the left Poles and the right pole are actually becoming more and more similar, i.e. SPD, Greens and Leftists on the one hand and the CDU/CSU as well as the FDP on the other. This does not apply to the AfD, it is perceived as clearly “right” by voters than the FDP, whereby “right” means the positioning on the socio -economic axis: The AfD's economic policy offer is perceived as more economic liberal than that of the FDP.
The graphic shows where the voters locate the parties. The vertical axis describes the migration policy (greater all gain ingredient), which make it more difficult to get back), the horizontal axis (expand welfare state vs. taxes).
(Photo: Gles Tracking T59,
Everyday language might speak of “left” and “neoliberal”. The AfD is therefore perceived as the “neoliberal” than the FDP.
This is the case with the voters. It is different among the experts. They continue to classify the FDP as the most liberal economic party.
This graphic illustrates where experts locate the parties. Here, too, the vertical axis describes migration policy (greater influx of hike more difficult), the horizontal axis (expansion of the welfare state vs. reduce taxes).
(Photo: Open Expert Survey 2025,
What about other topics?
On the topics of migration and climate policy, neither voters nor experts observe an increasing alignment of party positions. On the contrary, more polarization is perceived here. In migration policy, the parties have all moved to the right from the point of view of the experts, i.e. towards the AfD. But they still differ greatly from each other. In climate policy, the Greens are clearly perceived as the most progressive, as the “greenest” party, both by the voters and the experts. On both topics, Greens and AfD are the “pole parties”. You benefit from the fact that you are heavily linked to these topics: the Greens are perceived as a party, climate protection is important, the AfD is increasingly increasingly as a party of climate walls.
Is that the reason why the Greens lose less in the surveys compared to the Bundestag election 2021 than the SPD and FDP?
Yes, I think so. In science one speaks of the new gal/tan cleavage – the split between green, alternatively, libertarian, short gal, and traditionalist, authoritarian, nationalistic, i.e. TAN. This split is becoming increasingly important than the economic policy dimensions on the classic right-left scale. That means: topics such as migration policy, climate policy and also EU integration become more important for the election behavior. The new polar parties are no longer classic left parties on the one hand and economic-liberal parties on the other. But the right -wing populists and right -wing radicals on the one hand and the green parties on the other.
In every election campaign, the saying “It's the Economy, Stupid” is quoted, which Bill Clinton's campaign manager James Carville shaped in 1992.
Economy has always played a major role. But this time it doesn't seem to be that way. The latest data collected as part of the German election study are from October 2024. If I compare this with older data that go back to the 1980s, it is becoming apparent that the topic of economy is incredibly unimportant to the upcoming federal election.
Unimportant?
I was surprised myself, but you also have to look at this result. The survey asked for a trade-off, after a weighing up in a conflict of goals: is it more for an expansion of the welfare state and higher taxes, or for less welfare benefits, but also less tax? This topic seems to play a subordinate role in the upcoming election. It is overlaid by migration policy and climate policy. This reflects the conflict between the pole parties, between the Greens and the AfD. In 2021, the classic economic topics were very important for the election decision. At that time we were subsequently pandemic, it was about business aid for companies and similar topics. In the upcoming Bundestag election, the economy will be a rather subordinate topic.
Climate policy is an important topic? You don't really notice that in the election campaign.
We also use climate policy. Here is again asked about a trade-off: Should measures against climate change have a priority or economic growth? In this respect, economic policy plays a role in the current election campaign, but it is more about industrial and energy policy than the labor market policy and the welfare state.
If climate policy is very important in the election campaign, can this also mean that many voters are against climate protection?
Yes, here we actually see increasing polarization and thus growing resistance to climate policy measures.
Which database do you refer to?
I refer to data from the German election study Gles. This data is representative of the German electoral population and are regularly carried out by independent researchers according to scientific standards before and after the elections, but also during the legislative period. For the statements about the upcoming Bundestag election, I rely on the 59th wave of survey of Gles Tracking. For the statements on the expert assessments of the party positions, I rely on data from the Open Expert Surveys 2025, which I carried out with colleagues from the universities of Darmstadt, Greifswald, Oldenburg and Potsdam.
They spoke of the fact that the parties had moved to the right in migration policy. Is that a reaction to the AfD?
With the existing data it is difficult to produce causality. We do not know whether the discourse was postponed to the right due to the AfD or whether the preferences of the voters have changed and the parties have adapted to this. But what research shows, but also in an international comparison: If established parties react to the success of right -wing populist or right -wing radical parties by adapting their migration policy to the right, it doesn't work. Voters of right -wing populist or right -wing radical parties are not regained. In science, heads are often shaken that it is always tried.
However, Friedrich Merz's advance in the Bundestag, at least accepting majorities with votes from the AfD, at least did not harm the Union. And he didn't use the AfD.
You have to wait and see whether this specific event does not have an impact on the election behavior. If it is confirmed that the indirect collaboration between the Union and AfD had no effect in the Bundestag, then this could also be due to the fact that Merz quickly grew back and made it clear that there will be no collaboration with the AfD after the election. Maybe he noticed himself that it was not so clever step.
Did Merz contribute to making the parties more distinguishable by positioning the Union significantly more conservative than was the case under Angela Merkel?
Yes, you can say that. This is particularly true with a view to migration policy.
Robert Habeck said in the Quadrell that the day after the Bundestag election, the parties would have to step out of the “rituals” of the election campaign and work politically; Merz said very similarly that there is “February 23, there is also February 24th, and then we really have to solve the problems of our country. Is it a problem that parties rely on differences in the election campaign, but have to cooperate after the election?
I think the parties fall on their feet when they exclude things that they then want to do or have to do after the election. But that is nothing new for the parties, that is, so to speak, political business; It has always been like that. Of course, this also becomes more complicated with the more complex party system. The party system is more fragmented, the coalition options are limited by delimitation to the left and right. Even Union and SPD can no longer assume that they can definitely form a coalition of two.
Do you think it harms the Union if Alice Weidel Merz accuses that he will not be able to enforce his policy anyway because he will have to coalize with the SPD or Greens in the end?
I can't imagine that. I believe that many people will choose the CDU in the hope that it coalition with another democratic party after the election.
How does polarization affect how majorities are found in parliaments?
It gets more difficult. Above all, increasing fragmentation is a problem. On the one hand, this affects coalition formation. But it also becomes more difficult to say what is actually “the will to voters”. That used to be relatively clear. However, if the political room becomes so multidimensional when different topics are important and the party landscape is very differentiated, then there are many possible interpretations of the will to voters. This is the chaostheorem principle: in this multi -dimensional space there is no majority point – no point to say: This is the point that the majority preferred. On the contrary: There are other points for each point that are preferred by another majority. Of course that's a problem. This leaves the stability.
Hubertus Volmer spoke to Anna-Sophie Kurella.
